UL-142 STANDARD SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The SuperSafe Ballistics Protection
System is found in the composite thickness of our all-steel manufactured assembly. The 0.4375" minimum
thickness of the SuperSafe Tank exceeds the UFC and third-party determination of 0.375" composite thickness.
The SuperSafe
Control and Alarm System was engineered and built by Kelburn Engineering Company utilizing Gem Approved Components.
The SuperSafe Control Panel is engineered as a 'FailSafe' system, that means that even if it were to fail it will
fault in the alarm mode warning of impending high-level tank condition, of liquids accmulating in the Cylindrical
Dike, loss of Bonding-Grounding System, and water contamination in the filter sump.
Over time, more sophisticated control
system configurations have been developed to meet every need, including:
- High-level alarms, flow stoppage, pump shutdown, etc.
- Infinite volumetric LED readouts, programmable alarm settings.
- Leak sensing, liquid differential sensors, vapor sensors.
- Temperature monitoring.
- Water detection.
- Flow sensing.
- Positive Bonding Grounding System
- CFN computerized dispensing systems.
Speciality configurations to include, Electronic Deadman Controls, Heated Sumps, Pressure and Flow Monitors
and Controls, can be designed per the customers request.
The SuperSafe Fire Prevention System
logically results from the synergy of the SuperSafe Protection and Alarm Systems. Where required a SuperSafe Fire
Extinguishing System can be installed to meet local ordinances. Most often though emotionally-charged fire safety
issues often drive aboveground tank regulations, were prevention is the solution.
Historically, catastrophic aboveground
tank failures have occurred due to improper design or inadequate venting. Leading this list of causes were elevated
tanks on wood supports or steel trusses. Environmental devastation, not fire or explosion, are most often the legacy.
Those consequences occur from lack of or improper venting, leading to over-pressurization of the tank and subsequent
tank explosion.
Of recorded tank fires, 94 percent
were preceded by an overfill event, and five percent involved leaking components attached to the tank. The remainder
are attributable to ignorance, vandalism, arson and ballistics. In November, 1995, it was revealed to Underwriter
Laboratories that internal corrosion had lead to a vaulted concrete tank failure. Given this obvious weakness of
concrete vaulted tank design, getting back to basics is appropriate.
Recognized third-party testing facilities
have performed open-pool fire tests, and have concluding that a properly designed and built aboveground fuel tank
with properly sized and functioning emergency venting, and proven saddle design that won't collapse thereby rupturing
the vessel, will survive a fire incident. Even concrete tanks have to meet these criteria. During open- pool fire
testing demonstrations, the boiling fuel eventually vented out any opening available, ignited and burned continually
until the tank exhausted the fuel and the fire went out.
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